Assignment Mechanisms: Common Preferences and Information Acquisition

  title={Assignment Mechanisms: Common Preferences and Information Acquisition},
  author={Georgy Artemov},
  journal={ERN: Search},
I study costly information acquisition in a two-sided matching problem, such as matching applicants to schools. Applicant's utility is a sum of common and idiosyncratic components. The idiosyncratic component is unknown to applicants but can be learned at a cost. When applicants are assigned using an ordinal strategy-proof mechanism, too few acquire information, generating a significant welfare loss. Affirmative action and other realistic policies may lead to a Pareto improvement. As incentives… 


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