Assessing the Extent of Strategic Manipulation : the Average Vote Example

@inproceedings{Renault2011AssessingTE,
  title={Assessing the Extent of Strategic Manipulation : the Average Vote Example},
  author={R{\'e}gis Renault and Alain Trannoy},
  year={2011}
}
The average voting procedure re‡ects the weighted average of expressed opinions in [0,1]. Participants typically behave strategically. We evaluate the discrepancy between the average taste and the average vote. If the population is su¢ ciently large, it is possible to contruct approximations of both the average vote and the average taste which may be readily compared. We construct upper and lower bounds for the limit average vote that depend on the limit average taste. If the average taste is… CONTINUE READING

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