Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding

@article{Ausubel2002AscendingAW,
  title={Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding},
  author={Lawrence M. Ausubel and Paul R. Milgrom},
  journal={The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics},
  year={2002},
  volume={1}
}
Abstract A family of ascending package auction models is introduced in which bidders may determine their own packages on which to bid. In the proxy auction (revelation game) versions, the outcome is a point in the core of the exchange economy for the reported preferences. When payoffs are linear in money and goods are substitutes, sincere reporting constitutes a Nash equilibrium and the outcome coincides with the Vickrey auction outcome. Even when goods are not substitutes, ascending proxy… 

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