Art Auctions and Bidding Rings: Empirical Evidence from German Auction Data

  title={Art Auctions and Bidding Rings: Empirical Evidence from German Auction Data},
  author={M. Beckmann},
  journal={Journal of Cultural Economics},
  • M. Beckmann
  • Published 2004
  • Economics
  • Journal of Cultural Economics
  • This article illustrates the determinants of bidder collusion using data from German auctions. Special attention is thereby devoted to the question at whether art and antiques auctions are particularly attractive for bidding rings as the conditions for rings to succeed may be quite favorable at these auctions. Cartel stability at art auctions, for example, may be enforced by the structure of bidders or the expected surplus from collusive arrangements. Actually, the estimations of a binary… CONTINUE READING
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