Arrow's paradox and mathematical theory of democracy

@article{Tanguiane1994ArrowsPA,
  title={Arrow's paradox and mathematical theory of democracy},
  author={A. Tanguiane},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
  year={1994},
  volume={11},
  pages={1-82}
}
  • A. Tanguiane
  • Published 1994
  • Economics
  • Social Choice and Welfare
Two measures, the weight of coalitions and the probability of situations in decision making, are used to characterize the representativeness, i.e. the capability of individuals to represent the social preference. It is proved that there always exists an individual who represents a majority on average, and an individual who represents a majority in most cases. This result is applied to Arrow's social choice model. It follows that there always exists a dictator who is a representative of the… Expand
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