Arrow’s theorem as a corollary

@article{Nehring2003ArrowsTA,
  title={Arrow’s theorem as a corollary},
  author={K. Nehring},
  journal={Economics Letters},
  year={2003},
  volume={80},
  pages={379-382}
}
  • K. Nehring
  • Published 2003
  • Mathematics
  • Economics Letters
Abstract Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem is derived from a general result on social aggregation in ‘property spaces’ (S3 convex structures) obtained in prior work. In the derivation, the specific structure of Arrowian aggregation as an aggregation of weak orders plays a purely combinatorial role. 
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