Arms versus allies: trade-offs in the search for security

  title={Arms versus allies: trade-offs in the search for security},
  author={James D. Morrow},
  journal={International Organization},
  pages={207 - 233}
  • J. D. Morrow
  • Published 1 March 1993
  • Political Science
  • International Organization
Nations have two methods of increasing their security: building arms and forming alliances. Both methods present different political costs that must be incurred to raise security. Building arms requires shifting economic resources to the military. Forming alliances requires abandoning interests that conflict with those of the ally. Each of these strategies produces domestic opposition. A nation's response to a threat to its security must weigh the relative attractiveness of arms versus allies… 

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