Arm ’ s length relationships without moral hazard ∗

  title={Arm ’ s length relationships without moral hazard ∗},
  author={Jacques Cr{\'e}mer},
I show that cutting the flow of information between a principal and an agent can increase the power of the incentives of the agent to reveal private information. 

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