Are we free to break the laws

  title={Are we free to break the laws},
  author={David Lewis},
SOFT DETERMINISM seems to have an incredible consequence. It seems to imply, given certain acceptable further premises, that sometimes we are able to act in such a way that the laws of nature are broken. But if we distinguish a strong and a weak version of this incredible consequence, I think we shall find that it is the strong version that is incredible and the weak version that is the consequence. Soft determinism is the doctrine that sometimes one freely does what one is predetermined to do… Expand
The explanatory power of local miracle compatibilism
Local miracle compatibilists claim that we are sometimes able to do otherwise than we actually do, even if causal determinism obtains. When we can do otherwise, it will often be true that if we wereExpand
L/et us take incompatibilism to hold that, in order for any choice or other action to be free, it must be undetermined by prior events.1 Suppose that this thesis is correct. And suppose, further,Expand
Determinism, Laws of Nature and the Consequence Argument
Scott Sehon (2011) argues that the conception of determinism employed in the Consequence Argument is implausible because it rules out the logical possibility of the laws of nature being violated.Expand
A strengthening of the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism
The aim of the Consequence Argument is to show that, if determinism is true, no one has, or ever had, any choice about anything. In the stock version of the argument, its two premisses state that (i)Expand
To Be Able To, or To Be Able Not To? That is The Question
A type of transcendental argument for libertarian free will maintains that if acting freely requires the availability of alternative possibilities, and determinism holds, then one is not justified inExpand
What Is Determinism? Why We Should Ditch the Entailment Definition
What is the thesis of determinism? Though it is obvious that in principle there is more than one possible thesis that might be given this name, it seems to be the case that philosophers working onExpand
Saying Good-bye to the Direct Argument the Right Way
In "The Incompatibility of Responsibility and Determinism," Peter van Inwagen (1980) introduced the alluring Direct Argument. The Direct Argument tells us that moral responsibility is incompatibleExpand
The Dialectical Advantage of the Direct Argument
Traditionally, incompatibilists about moral responsibility and determinism claim that we cannot be morally responsible unless we could have done otherwise and that we cannot do otherwise if we areExpand
Can Physics Make Us Free?
A thoroughly physical view on reality and our common sense view on agency and free will seem to be in a direct conflict with each other: if everything that happens is determined by prior physicalExpand
Free Will and Miracles
The Consequence Argument is sound only if no one has a choice about the laws of nature, and one prominent compatibilist reply to the argument—championed by David Lewis (1981)—begins by claiming thatExpand


The incompatibility of free will and determinism
We have a very strong intuition and a very strong feeling that we, as human beings, generally have freedom of the will and freedom of the action. It seems that in most situations we can do this orExpand
A formal approach to the problem of free will and determinism
I n this paper I will present simple formal statements of thetheses of free will and universal causal determinism, and show that while these theses are not formal contraries or contradictories, thereExpand
Preferences, Conditionals and Freedom
Richard Taylor directed my dissertation on the subject of freedom and determinism, and we amiably and constructively disagreed about the subject then. I was a compatibilist, he was not. I still am;Expand
Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow
Today I am typing words on a page. Suppose today were different. Suppose I were typing different words. Then plainly tomorrow would be different also; for instance, different words would appear onExpand
Reply to Narveson
Time and Cause
Basic conditional logic