Are we free to break the laws

@article{Lewis2008AreWF,
  title={Are we free to break the laws},
  author={David Lewis},
  journal={Theoria},
  year={2008},
  volume={47},
  pages={113-121}
}
  • D. Lewis
  • Published 11 February 2008
  • Philosophy
  • Theoria
SOFT DETERMINISM seems to have an incredible consequence. It seems to imply, given certain acceptable further premises, that sometimes we are able to act in such a way that the laws of nature are broken. But if we distinguish a strong and a weak version of this incredible consequence, I think we shall find that it is the strong version that is incredible and the weak version that is the consequence. Soft determinism is the doctrine that sometimes one freely does what one is predetermined to do… 

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