Are we explaining consciousness yet?

  title={Are we explaining consciousness yet?},
  author={Daniel C. Dennett},
  • D. Dennett
  • Published 1 April 2001
  • Psychology, Art
  • Cognition
A New Theory of Consciousness: The Missing Link - Organization
It is proposed that just like energy is the physical element that causes action, there is another physical element which has the capacity to cause organization which is called NASCIUM which is the missing link.
Could Consciousness Be an Illusion?
The obvious argument shows that there is evidently a basic difference between the case of consciousness and other aspects of experience that one might think are immediately revealed to us. Think, for
Comparative psychology without consciousness
block : comparing the major theories of consciousness 1111 77 Comparing the Major Theories of Consciousness
  • Psychology
  • 2013
This article compares the three frameworks for theories of consciousness that are taken most seriously by neuroscientists: the view that consciousness is a biological state of the brain, the global
1 Making Consciousness Safe for Neuroscience
Work on consciousness by neurophilosophers often leaves a certain group of other philosophers frustrated. The latter group of philosophers, which includes people such as Thomas Nagel, Frank Jackson,
Consciousness: the radical plasticity thesis.
It is argued that the functions of consciousness are implemented in a bio-computational manner, and it is proposed that machine consciousness may be produced by similar adaptive algorithms running on the machine.
Consciousness and metarepresentation: A computational sketch
Defining consciousness in the context of incidental sequence learning: theoretical considerations and empirical implications
A definition of consciousness is taken according to which conscious mental contents are characterized by their global availability to cognitive processes (e.g., Baars in: A cognitive theory of consciousness Cambridge University Press, 1988) and it is argued that unlike recognition tests or generate tasks, verbal report is a sensitive and specific measure of conscious sequence knowledge.
Moral significance of phenomenal consciousness.


Consciousness in philosophy and cognitive neuroscience
Contents: Preface. A. Revonsuo, M. Kamppinen, S. Sajama, General Introduction: The Riddle of Consciousness. Part I: What Is Consciousness? A. Revonsuo, The Appearance and Reality of Consciousness. I.
Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness
To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. In this paper, I first isolate the truly hard part of the problem, separating it from more tractable parts and
Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain
Abstract We compare the way two models of consciousness treat subjective timing. According to the standard “Cartesian Theater” model, there is a place in the brain where “it all comes together,” and
Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The 1996 Tucson Discussions and Debates
Part 1 Philosophy of mind: facing up to the problem of consciousness, David J. Chalmers consciousness and the introspective link principle, Giiven Guzeldere the place of qualia in the world of
Minds, brains, and programs
  • J. Searle
  • Philosophy
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • 1980
Only a machine could think, and only very special kinds of machines, namely brains and machines with internal causal powers equivalent to those of brains, and no program by itself is sufficient for thinking.
Explaining consciousness : The hard problem
Part 1 The hard problem: facing up to the problem of consciousness, David J. Chalmers. Part 2 Deflationary perspectives: facing backwards on the problem of consciousness, Daniel C. Dennett the
Consciousness and Commentaries
There are several neuropsychological syndromes in which good residual function is retained in the absence of acknowledged awareness, among them blindsight, amnesia, and unilateral neglect. All of
Dennett's philosophy: a comprehensive assessment
The influential philosopher Daniel Dennett is best known for his distinctive theory of mental content, his elucidation of how the complex components of mental processing seem to come together in the
No bridge over the stream of consciousness
Although filling-in of various kinds does appear to occur in the brain, it is not required in order to furnish a “bridge locus” where neural events are “isomorphic” to the features of visual consciousness.
Quining Qualia
"Qualia" is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. As is so often the case with philosophical jargon, it is easier to give