Are moral judgments unified?

  title={Are moral judgments unified?},
  author={Walter P. Sinnott-Armstrong and T. Wheatley},
  journal={Philosophical Psychology},
  pages={451 - 474}
  • Walter P. Sinnott-Armstrong, T. Wheatley
  • Published 2014
  • Psychology
  • Philosophical Psychology
  • Whenever psychologists, neuroscientists, or philosophers draw conclusions about moral judgments in general from a small selected sample, they assume that moral judgments are unified by some common and peculiar feature that enables generalizations and makes morality worthy of study as a unified field. We assess this assumption by considering the six main candidates for a unifying feature: content, phenomenology, force, form, function, and brain mechanisms. We conclude that moral judgment is not… CONTINUE READING
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