• DOI:10.1080/09515089.2012.736075
Corpus ID: 143876741

Are moral judgments unified?

@article{SinnottArmstrong2014AreMJ,
  title={Are moral judgments unified?},
  author={Walter P. Sinnott-Armstrong and T. Wheatley},
  journal={Philosophical Psychology},
  year={2014},
  volume={27},
  pages={451 - 474}
}

Walter P. Sinnott-Armstrong, T. Wheatley

Published 2014

Psychology

Philosophical Psychology

Whenever psychologists, neuroscientists, or philosophers draw conclusions about moral judgments in general from a small selected sample, they assume that moral judgments are unified by some common and peculiar feature that enables generalizations and makes morality worthy of study as a unified field. We assess this assumption by considering the six main candidates for a unifying feature: content, phenomenology, force, form, function, and brain mechanisms. We conclude that moral judgment is not… CONTINUE READING

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