Are moral judgments unified?

  title={Are moral judgments unified?},
  author={Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Thalia Wheatley},
  journal={Philosophical Psychology},
  pages={451 - 474}
Whenever psychologists, neuroscientists, or philosophers draw conclusions about moral judgments in general from a small selected sample, they assume that moral judgments are unified by some common and peculiar feature that enables generalizations and makes morality worthy of study as a unified field. We assess this assumption by considering the six main candidates for a unifying feature: content, phenomenology, force, form, function, and brain mechanisms. We conclude that moral judgment is not… 

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