Are low-price promises collusion guarantees? An experimental test of price matching policies

@inproceedings{Fatas2007AreLP,
  title={Are low-price promises collusion guarantees? An experimental test of price matching policies},
  author={Enrique Fatas and Juan A. M{\'a}{\~n}ez},
  year={2007}
}
In a symmetric differentiated experimental duopoly we test the ability of Price Matching Guarantees (PMG) to raise prices above the competitive levels. PMG are introduced both as a market rule (the selling price is always the lowest posted price) and as a business strategy (subjects decide whether or not to offer them). Our results show that PMG lead to a clear collusive outcome as markets quickly and fully converge to the collusive prediction if PMG are imposed as a market rule. Whenever… CONTINUE READING
BETA

Figures, Tables, and Topics from this paper.

References

Publications referenced by this paper.
SHOWING 1-10 OF 16 REFERENCES

Promises to match or beat rival prices

  • M Arbatskaya, M Hviid, G Shaffer
  • 1999
Highly Influential
4 Excerpts

games with provision points: an experimental study

  • M Capra, JK Goeree, R Gómez, CA Holt
  • Econ Inq
  • 2002
1 Excerpt

Effective price-matching: a comment

  • Int J Ind Organ 18:1291–1294 Logan J, Lutter R
  • 2000
1 Excerpt

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…