Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all? Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgment under uncertainty

@article{Cosmides1996AreHG,
  title={Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all? Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgment under uncertainty},
  author={Leda Cosmides and John Tooby},
  journal={Cognition},
  year={1996},
  volume={58},
  pages={1-73}
}

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