Are Workers Willing to Pay to Join a Better Team?

@article{Zimmerfaust2018AreWW,
  title={Are Workers Willing to Pay to Join a Better Team?},
  author={Thomas Zimmerfaust},
  journal={Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Inquiry},
  year={2018}
}
  • Thomas Zimmerfaust
  • Published 1 April 2018
  • Economics, Business
  • Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Inquiry
Using data from the Major League Baseball free‐agent market, this study is the first to show that the productivity expected of the team a worker will join produces a significant, negative compensating wage differential. The younger workers in the sample drive this result, trading 25% of their wages to join teams with an expected productivity one standard deviation higher. This investment can be recouped if a reasonable increase in human capital occurs. These results are robust to contract… 

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