Are Top Executives Paid Enough? An Evidence-Based Review

@article{Jacquart2013AreTE,
  title={Are Top Executives Paid Enough? An Evidence-Based Review},
  author={Philippe Jacquart and J. Scott Armstrong},
  journal={Employee Benefits},
  year={2013}
}
Our review of the evidence found that the notion that higher pay leads to the selection of better executives is undermined by the prevalence of poor recruiting methods. Moreover, higher pay fails to promote better performance. Instead, it undermines the intrinsic motivation of executives, inhibits their learning, leads them to ignore other stakeholders, and discourages them from considering the long-term effects of their decisions on stakeholders. Relating incentive payments to executives… 

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