Are Species Really Individuals

  title={Are Species Really Individuals},
  author={David L. Hull},
  journal={Systematic Biology},
  • D. Hull
  • Published 1 June 1976
  • Philosophy
  • Systematic Biology
Hull, David L. (Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201) 1976. Are species really individuals? Syst. Zool. 25:174-191.The processes which contribute to the evolution of biological species take place at a variety of levels of organization; e.g., genes give rise to other genes, organisms give rise to other organisms, and species give rise to other species. All of these processes require continuity through descent. If species are to be units of… 

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  • D. Baum
  • Biology, Environmental Science
    Systematic biology
  • 1998
Although species individuality requires significant changes to systematic practice and challenges some preconceptions about the ontology of species, it provides the only sound basis for asserting that species exist independently of human perception.

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  • L. Cohen
  • Philosophy
    The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • 1974
and/or difference does play a role, just as IQ tests help in discovering how bright children are, but I take it to be a commonplace among philosophers that such methods of discernment do not define


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  • Biology
    The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • 1965
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