Are IMF lending programs good or bad for democracy?

@article{Nelson2017AreIL,
  title={Are IMF lending programs good or bad for democracy?},
  author={S. Nelson and Geoffrey P. R. Wallace},
  journal={The Review of International Organizations},
  year={2017},
  volume={12},
  pages={523-558}
}
Have IMF lending programs undermined political democracy in borrowing countries? Building on the extensive literature on conditional lending, we outline several pathways through which IMF program participation might affect the levels of democracy in borrowing countries - including a new variant that suggests the possibility of a positive association between lending program participation and democracy scores. In order to test the argument we assemble annual data from 120 low- and middle-income… Expand

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