Are External Reasons Impossible?

@article{Cohon1986AreER,
  title={Are External Reasons Impossible?},
  author={Rachel Cohon},
  journal={Ethics},
  year={1986},
  volume={96},
  pages={545 - 556}
}
It is clear that our desires and aims provide us with some reasons for action. Are there also reasons for action that are not contingent upon what desires or aims we have? In his article "Internal and External Reasons,"' Bernard Williams answers a version of this question in the negative. He offers an argument intended to show that there are no reasons to perform actions that would not satisfy the agent's desires, aims, or other "motives." I shall try to bring into sharp focus what I take to be… 

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