Are Adjustments Insufficient?

  title={Are Adjustments Insufficient?},
  author={Nicholas Epley and Thomas Gilovich},
  journal={Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin},
  pages={447 - 460}
  • N. EpleyT. Gilovich
  • Published 1 April 2004
  • Psychology
  • Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
Many judgmental biases are thought to be the product of insufficient adjustment from an initial anchor value. Nearly all existing evidence of insufficient adjustment, however, comes from an experimental paradigm that evidence indicates does not involve adjustment at all. In this article, the authors first provide further evidence that some kinds of anchors (those that are self-generated and known to be incorrect but close to the correct answer) activate processes of adjustment, whereas others… 

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