• Corpus ID: 20986536

Architectural process models of decision making: Towards a model database

  title={Architectural process models of decision making: Towards a model database},
  author={Cvetomir Dimov and Julian N. Marewski and Lael J. Schooler},
  journal={Cognitive Science},
We present the project aimed at creating a database of detailed architectural process models of memory-based decision models. Those models are implemented in the cognitive architecture ACT-R. In creating this database, we have identified commonalities and differences of various decision models in the literature. The model database can provide insights into the interrelation among decision models and can be used in future research to address debates on inferences from memory, which are hard to… 
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