Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values

  title={Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values},
  author={Yunan Li},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
This paper studies the revenue maximization problem in environments wherein buyers have interdependent values and correlated types. We show that (1) when the system of feasible sets is a matroid and buyer valuations satisfy a single-crossing condition, the generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms with lazy reserves (VCG-L) are ex-post incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational; (2) if, in addition, the valuation distribution satisfies a generalized monotone hazard rate condition… CONTINUE READING


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Auction theory, 2nd Edition

  • V. Krishna
  • 2009
Highly Influential
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