Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values

@inproceedings{Li2013ApproximationIM,
  title={Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values},
  author={Yunan Li},
  booktitle={EC},
  year={2013}
}
The seminal work of [Myerson 1981] shows that the simple Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism with monopoly reserves is optimal in single-item auctions where agents have independent and identically distributed private values. [Hartline and Roughgarden 2009] and others prove approximate analogs of this statement in the more general one-dimensional type, independent private values setting. This paper studies the design of ex-post incentive compatible and approximately optimal mechanism in an… CONTINUE READING

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