# Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Budget-Additive Valuations

@article{Garg2018ApproximatingTN,
title={Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Budget-Additive Valuations},
author={Jugal Garg and Martin Hoefer and Kurt Mehlhorn},
journal={ArXiv},
year={2018},
volume={abs/1707.04428}
}
• Published 14 July 2017
• Economics
• ArXiv
We present the first constant-factor approximation algorithm for maximizing the Nash social welfare when allocating indivisible items to agents with budget-additive valuation functions. Budget-additive valuations represent an important class of submodular functions. They have attracted a lot of research interest in recent years due to many interesting applications. For every $\varepsilon > 0$, our algorithm obtains a $(2.404 + \varepsilon)$-approximation in time polynomial in the input size and…
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