Approximately optimal mechanism design: motivation, examples, and lessons learned

@article{Roughgarden2015ApproximatelyOM,
  title={Approximately optimal mechanism design: motivation, examples, and lessons learned},
  author={Tim Roughgarden},
  journal={SIGecom Exch.},
  year={2015},
  volume={13},
  pages={4-20}
}
  • Tim Roughgarden
  • Published 2015
  • Mathematics, Economics, Computer Science
  • SIGecom Exch.
  • This survey describes the approximately optimal mechanism design paradigm and uses it to investigate two basic questions in auction theory. First, when is complexity --- in the sense of detailed distributional knowledge --- an essential feature of revenue-maximizing single-item auctions? Second, do combinatorial auctions require high-dimensional bid spaces to achieve good social welfare? 

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