Approximately Strategy-Proof Voting

  title={Approximately Strategy-Proof Voting},
  author={Eleanor Birrell and Rafael Pass},
The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem establishes that only dictatorial voting rules are strategy-proof; under any other voting rule, players have an incentive to lie about their true preferences. We consider a new approach for circumventing this result: we consider randomized voting rules that only approximate a deterministic voting rule and only are approximately strategy-proof. We show that any deterministic voting rule can be approximated by an approximately strategy-proof randomized… CONTINUE READING
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