Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design

@article{Roughgarden2018ApproximatelyOM,
  title={Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design},
  author={T. Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2018},
  volume={abs/1812.11896}
}
Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, and also a number of killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from how governments sell wireless spectrum licenses to how the major search engines auction off online advertising. There are, however, some basic problems for which the traditional optimal mechanism design approach is ill-suited---either because it makes overly strong assumptions, or because it advocates overly complex… Expand
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