• Corpus ID: 555569

Approximately Efficient Cost-Sharing Mechanisms

  title={Approximately Efficient Cost-Sharing Mechanisms},
  author={Tim Roughgarden and Mukund Sundararajan},
We study cost-sharing mechanisms for several fundamental NP-hard combinatorial optimization problems. A cost-sharing mechanism is a protocol that, given bids for a service, determines which bidders to serve and what prices to charge. The mechanism incurs a subset-dependent cost that is implicitly defined by an instance of a combinatorial optimizat ion problem. Three desirable but mutually incompatible properties of a cost-sharing mechanism are: incentive-compatibility, meaning that players are… 

Figures from this paper

Optimal Efficiency Guarantees for Network Design Mechanisms
This work proves for the first time that approximate budget-balance and efficiency are simultaneously possible in a cost-sharing problem and proves a new, optimal lower bound on the approximate efficiency achievable by the wide and natural class of "Moulin mechanisms".
The Power of Lexicographic Maximization: Beyond Cross-Monotonicity
In a cost-sharing problem, finitely many players have an unknown preference for some non-rivalrous but excludable good (service). The task is to determine which set of players Q to serve and how to
To Be or Not to Be ( Served ) : Cost Sharing Without Indifferences ∗
In a cost-sharing problem, finitely many players have unknown valuations for some service, and a mechanism is sought for determining which players to serve and how to distribute the incurred cost. An
Optimal group strategyproof cost sharing: budget-balance vs. efficiency (Draft)
Units of good are produced at some non-negative cost. A mechanism elicits the willingness to pay of the agents for getting one unit of the good, allocates some goods to some agents, and covers the
Optimal Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for Steiner Forest Problems
The KLS mechanism for Steiner forest cost-sharing problems has the smallest-possible worst-case efficiency loss, up to constant factors, among all O(1)-budget-balanced Moulin mechanisms for such cost functions.
To Be or Not to Be (Served)
This work introduces a slight modification of GSP that is called CGSP, allowing it to achieve vastly better results concerning budgetbalance (BB) and economic efficiency (EFF) and gives new CGSP mechanisms that are called "egalitarian" due to being inspired by Dutta and Ray's (1989)egalitarian solution.
Collusion-proof cost sharing mechanisms ( Draft )
An auction type mechanism elicits the valuations for getting a good (service) from the agents, allocates some goods (service) to some agents and charge money only to the served agents. We
Optimal group strategyproof cost sharing ∗
Units of a good are produced at some symmetric cost. We study mechanisms that allocate goods and their production cost to some agents based on their private valuation. In general, such mechanisms are
Prior-free cost sharing design: group strategyproofness and the worst absolute loss
A service is produced for a set of agents at some cost. The service is bi- nary, each agent either receives service or not. A mechanism elicits the willingness to pay of the agents for getting
Beyond moulin mechanisms
Acyclic mechanisms are proposed, a new framework for designing truthful, approximately budget-balanced cost-sharing mechanisms that have exponentially better budget-balance and economicefficiency than Moulin mechanisms.


New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms
It is shown that incentive-compatibility, budget-balance, and approximate efficiency are simultaneously achievable for a wide range of cost functions, where efficiency is measured using the social cost---the sum of the incurred service cost and the excluded valuations.
Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
This paper investigates the limitations imposed by the cross-monotonicity property on cost-sharing schemes for several combinatorial optimization games including edge cover, vertex cover, set cover, metric facility location, maximum flow, arborescence packing, and maximum matching, and develops a novel technique based on the probabilistic method for proving upper bounds on the budget-balance factor ofCross-monotonic cost sharing schemes.
Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for Network Design
The algorithm is conceptually simpler than the previous such cost-sharing method due to Pál and Tardos, and improves the previously-known approximation factor of 15 to 4.6.
Approximation via cost-sharing: a simple approximation algorithm for the multicommodity rent-or-buy problem
This paper gives a conceptually simple 12-approximation algorithm for the multicommodity rent-or-buy problem, and is the first to show the converse - those ideas from cost sharing can be fruitfully applied in the design and analysis of approximation algorithms.
A group-strategyproof mechanism for Steiner forests
The cost-sharing method presented in this paper is 2-approximate budget-balanced and this is tight with respect to the budget-balance factor and the dual solution computed by the algorithm is infeasible but it is proved that its total value is at most the cost of a minimum-cost Steiner forest for the given instance.
Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
Abstract. Each one of n users consumes an idiosyncratic commodity produced in indivisible units. The n commodities are jointly produced by a central facility and total cost must be shared by the
Group strategy proof mechanisms via primal-dual algorithms
  • Martin Pál, É. Tardos
  • Business
    44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2003. Proceedings.
  • 2003
We develop a general method for turning a primal-dual algorithm into a group strategy proof cost-sharing mechanism. We use our method to design approximately budget balanced cost sharing mechanisms
Equitable cost allocations via primal-dual-type algorithms
A large class of group strategyproof cost sharing methods, for submodular cost functions, satisfying a wide range of fairness criteria, thereby allowing the service provider to choose a method that best satisfies the notion of fairness that is most relevant to her application.
Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions
It is proved that marginal cost and Shapley value have a natural algorithm that uses only two messages per link of the multicast tree, while it is shown that the welfare value achieved by an optimal multicasts tree is NP-hard to approximate within any constant factor, even for bounded-degree networks.
From Primal-Dual to Cost Shares and Back: A Stronger LP Relaxation for the Steiner Forest Problem
It is argued that no cross-monotonic cost sharing method can achieve a budget balance factor of less than 2 for the Steiner tree and Steiner forest games.