Corpus ID: 220496632

Approximate mechanism design for distributed facility location

  title={Approximate mechanism design for distributed facility location},
  author={Aris Filos-Ratsikas and Alexandros A. Voudouris},
  • Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros A. Voudouris
  • Published 2020
  • Computer Science
  • ArXiv
  • We consider the distributed facility location problem, in which there is a set of agents positioned on the real line, who are also partitioned into multiple symmetric districts. The goal is to choose a single location (where a public facility is to be built) so as to minimize the total distance of the agents from that location. Importantly, this process is distributed: the positions of the agents in each district are first aggregated into a representative location for the district, and then one… CONTINUE READING
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