Approximate Truth and Truthlikeness

@inproceedings{Hilpinen1976ApproximateTA,
  title={Approximate Truth and Truthlikeness},
  author={Risto Hilpinen},
  year={1976}
}
Our standard logic is two-valued: every meaningful statement is regarded as being either true or false. Thus it may seem pointless or misleading to speak of degrees of truth or of partial truth. Nevertheless these expressions are commonplace in writings on epistomology and the philosophy of science, and it has been argued that an explication of the concept of partial truth is necessary for an adequate analysis and understanding of scientific method. For instance, in his book The Myth of… 

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