Approval voting and strategy analysis: A Venetian example

  title={Approval voting and strategy analysis: A Venetian example},
  author={Marji Lines},
  journal={Theory and Decision},
  • M. Lines
  • Published 1 March 1986
  • Economics
  • Theory and Decision
The author presents a historic reconstruction of the single-member constituency election system known as approval voting which was used to elect Venetian dogi for over 500 years. An interesting procedure theoretically, concurrent approval voting is the only sincere single-winner election system. Central issues concerning strategy choice under uncertainty are investigated using a contingency-dependent framework of individual behavior given prior probability distributions over decision relevant… 
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