Approval voting and scoring rules with common values

  title={Approval voting and scoring rules with common values},
  author={David S. Ahn and Santiago Oliveros},
  journal={J. Economic Theory},
We compare approval voting with other scoring rules for environments with common values and private information. For finite electorates, the best equilibrium under approval voting is superior to plurality rule or negative voting. For large electorates, if any scoring rule yields a sequence of equilibria that aggregates information, then approval voting must do so as well. 

From This Paper

Topics from this paper.


Publications citing this paper.
Showing 1-4 of 4 extracted citations


Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-7 of 7 references

Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents,

A. McLennan
American Political Science Review, • 1998
View 6 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Probability and Measure

P. Billingsley
Journal of Public Economics, • 1995
View 1 Excerpt
Highly Influenced

Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules

Mathematical Social Sciences • 2014
View 2 Excerpts

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…