Approval voting: three examples

  title={Approval voting: three examples},
  author={Francesco De Sinopoli and Bhaskar Dutta and Jean-François Laslier},
  journal={International Journal of Game Theory},
In this paper we discuss three examples of approval voting games. The first one illustrates that a stronger solution concept than perfection is needed for a strategic analysis of this type of games. The second example shows that sophisticated voting can imply that the Condorcet winner gets no vote. The third example shows the possibility of insincere voting being a stable equilibrium. 
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  • R. Niemi
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    American Political Science Review
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