Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games

@article{Flesch2018ApproachabilityOC,
  title={Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games},
  author={J{\'a}nos Flesch and Rida Laraki and Vianney Perchet},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2018},
  volume={abs/1609.08870}
}
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Approachability with constraints
CAMBRIDGE WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS CAMBRIDGE-INET WORKING PAPERS Approachability with Discounting
We establish a version of Blackwell’s (1956) approachability result with discounting. Our main result shows that, for convex sets, our notion of approachability with discounting is equivalent to…

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