Appendix: Outlines of Constitutional Powers in Latin America

@inproceedings{Carey1997AppendixOO,
  title={Appendix: Outlines of Constitutional Powers in Latin America},
  author={John M. Carey and Oct{\'a}vio Amorim Neto and M. Shugart},
  year={1997}
}
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