Antitrust Policy After Chicago

  title={Antitrust Policy After Chicago},
  author={Herbert J. Hovenkamp},
  journal={ERPN: Antitrust (Sub-Topic)},
This article, which was published in 1985, describes the development of a "Post-Chicago" antitrust policy. The Chicago School of antitrust analysis has made an important and lasting contribution to antitrust policy. The School has placed an emphasis on economic analysis in antitrust jurisprudence that will likely never disappear. At the same time, however, the Chicago School's approach to antitrust is defective for two important reasons. First of all, the notion that public policymaking should… Expand
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377 (1956) (cellophane); and E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co
  • 1980
This may have happened in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co
  • 1980
Williamson argues that in this case dominant, capital-intensive firms sought or approved a wage contract calling for higher wages
  • A related instance of strategic raising of the costs of rivals is discussed in Williamson
  • 1965
(BNA) No. 1250, at 185 (C.D. Cal
    205. Examples of monopolies that almost certainly produced far more than was produced before the monopoly came into existence are the monopolies at issue in United States v