Anticipatory learning in two-person games : some experimental results q

@inproceedings{Tang2000AnticipatoryLI,
  title={Anticipatory learning in two-person games : some experimental results q},
  author={Fang-Fang Tang},
  year={2000}
}
Crawford [Econometrica 42 (1974) 885; J. Econ. Behavior Organ. 6 (1985) 69] has presented a striking example in which plausible adaptive learning rules fail to locate a straightforward mixed-strategy equilibrium. However, Selten [Game Equilibrium Models I. Springer, Berlin 1991, p. 98] argued that such learning rules can be stabilized for some games if there is an anticipation component in the learning process. This paper reports on an experiment designed to test Selten’s predictions. There is… CONTINUE READING
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