Anti-realism in the philosophy of probability: Bruno de Finetti's subjectivism

@article{Galavotti1989AntirealismIT,
  title={Anti-realism in the philosophy of probability: Bruno de Finetti's subjectivism},
  author={M. C. Galavotti},
  journal={Erkenntnis},
  year={1989},
  volume={31},
  pages={239-261}
}
  • M. C. Galavotti
  • Published 1989
  • Philosophy
  • Erkenntnis
  • Bruno de Finetti is known as an upholder of that subjectivistic view of probability, whose first extensive formulation is generally ascribed to F. P. Ramsey, and whose popularity is associated with the work of L. J. Savage. His view is thought of as opposed to frequentism, but related to the classical, and sometimes also the logical interpretation of probability. In fact, de Finetti puts forward a conception of probability that is not only incompatible with any perspective based on an objective… CONTINUE READING
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