Anti-exceptionalism about logic

  title={Anti-exceptionalism about logic},
  author={Ole Thomassen Hjortland},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
  • O. Hjortland
  • Published 1 March 2017
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophical Studies
Logic isn’t special. Its theories are continuous with science; its method continuous with scientific method. Logic isn’t a priori, nor are its truths analytic truths. Logical theories are revisable, and if they are revised, they are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories. These are the tenets of anti-exceptionalism about logic. The position is most famously defended by Quine, but has more recent advocates in Maddy (Proc Address Am Philos Assoc 76:61–90, 2002), Priest (Doubt truth to… 

Logic and science: science and logic

According to Ole Hjortland, Timothy Williamson, Graham Priest, and others, anti-exceptionalism about logic is the view that logic “isn’t special”, but is continuous with the sciences. Logic is

Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic

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Anti-exceptionalism about logic is the doctrine that logic does not require its own epistemology, for its methods are continuous with those of science. Although most recently urged by Williamson, the

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Forthcoming in Graham Priest on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency, Can Başkent and Thomas Ferguson (eds.), Dordrecht: Springer Priest’s Anti-Exceptionalism, Candrakı̄rti and Paraconsistency

In the context of the philosophy of logic, anti-exceptionalism is the view that logic does not have any special status in relation to empirical sciences and that the methodology for theorising about

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Philosophers of science often assume that logically equivalent theories are theoretically equivalent. I argue that two theses, anti-exceptionalism about logic (which says, roughly, that logic is not

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  • C. Field
  • Philosophy, Psychology
    Acta analytica : philosophy and psychology
  • 2021
It is argued that, as for other topics, one’s total evidence can sometimes support false beliefs about what rationality requires, and that such beliefs incur heavy explanatory burdens that the authors should avoid.



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