Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths

@article{Roland2011AntiLuckEA,
  title={Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths},
  author={Jeffrey W. Roland and Jon Cogburn},
  journal={Philosophia},
  year={2011},
  volume={39},
  pages={547-561}
}
That believing truly as a matter of luck does not generally constitute knowing has become epistemic commonplace. Accounts of knowledge incorporating this anti-luck idea frequently rely on one or another of a safety or sensitivity condition. Sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge have a well-known problem with necessary truths, to wit, that any believed necessary truth trivially counts as knowledge on such accounts. In this paper, we argue that safety-based accounts similarly trivialize… CONTINUE READING

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