Antebellum Tariff Politics: Coalition Formation and Shifting Regional Interests

@article{Irwin2006AntebellumTP,
  title={Antebellum Tariff Politics: Coalition Formation and Shifting Regional Interests},
  author={Douglas A. Irwin},
  journal={Economic History},
  year={2006}
}
  • D. Irwin
  • Published 1 April 2006
  • Economics, History
  • Economic History
Throughout U.S. history, import tariffs have been put on a sustained downward path in only two instances: from the early-1830s until the Civil War and from the mid-1930s to the present. This paper analyzes how the movement toward higher tariffs in the 1820s was reversed for the rest of the antebellum period. Tariff politics in Congress during this period was highly sectional: the North supported high tariffs, the South favored low tariffs, and the West was a %u201Cswing%u201D region. In the… 
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