Another attack on A5/1

@article{Ekdahl2003AnotherAO,
  title={Another attack on A5/1},
  author={Patrik Ekdahl and Thomas Johansson},
  journal={IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory},
  year={2003},
  volume={49},
  pages={284-289}
}
A5/1 is a stream cipher used in the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) standard. Several time-memory tradeoff attacks against A5/1 have been proposed, most notably the attack by Biryukov, Shamir and Wagner (1978), which can break A5/1 in seconds using huge precomputation time and memory. This article presents a completely different attack on A5/1, based on ideas from correlation attacks. Whereas time-memory tradeoff attacks have a complexity which is exponential with the shift… 

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VIII. BIOGRAPHIES

  • VIII. BIOGRAPHIES

A pedagogical implementation of A5/1

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98) was born in Malmö He received his M.Sc. in Electrical Engineering from Lund University

  • May 1998 he became a graduate student at the Department of Information
  • 1972