Another Look at "Provable Security"

@article{Koblitz2005AnotherLA,
  title={Another Look at "Provable Security"},
  author={Neal Koblitz and Alfred Menezes},
  journal={Journal of Cryptology},
  year={2005},
  volume={20},
  pages={3-37}
}
AbstractWe give an informal analysis and critique of several typical "provable security" results. In some cases there are intuitive but convincing arguments for rejecting the conclusions suggested by the formal terminology and "proofs," whereas in other cases the formalism seems to be consistent with common sense. We discuss the reasons why the search for mathematically convincing theoretical evidence to support the security of public-key systems has been an important theme of researchers… 
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