Corpus ID: 53522791

Animal minds, animal morality

@article{McGinn1995AnimalMA,
  title={Animal minds, animal morality},
  author={C. McGinn},
  journal={Social Research},
  year={1995},
  volume={62},
  pages={731-747}
}
  • C. McGinn
  • Published 1995
  • Sociology
  • Social Research
Soulevant la question des fondements ontologiques et psychologiques des reactions et des jugements moraux, l'A. montre que les experiences simultanees decrites par Frege chez les sujets conscients sont vecues de la meme facon par les animaux. Definissant l'existence du sujet experimentant comme la condition minimale de la moralite, l'A. conclut a la capacite morale des animaux 
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