And Criticism Alternative Possibilities : a Reply to Lamb

  • Published 2011

Abstract

A powerful and pervasive view holds that an individual can be morally responsible for his actions only if he is able (at some suitable time) to do other than he actually does. This is the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). Because causal determinism appears to threaten our freedom to do otherwise, the principle is a potent tool in the argument that causal determinism rules out moral responsibility. If there are counterexamples to the principle, then at least this particular route to the incompatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility is blocked. Harry Frankfurt' has presented a series of putative counterexamples to PAP. Here is his description of such a case:

Cite this paper

@inproceedings{2011AndCA, title={And Criticism Alternative Possibilities : a Reply to Lamb}, author={}, year={2011} }