An improved welfare guarantee for first-price auctions

@article{Hoy2019AnIW,
  title={An improved welfare guarantee for first-price auctions},
  author={D. Hoy and Sam Taggart and Zihe Wang},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2019},
  volume={abs/1803.06707}
}
  • D. Hoy, Sam Taggart, Zihe Wang
  • Published 2019
  • Computer Science, Economics, Mathematics
  • ArXiv
We highlight recent progress in worst-case analysis of welfare in first price auctions. It was shown in [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013] that in any Bayes-Nash equilibrium of a first-price auction, the expected social welfare is at least a (1 - 1/e) ≈ .63-fraction of optimal. This result uses smoothness, the standard technique for worst-case welfare analysis of games, and is tight if bidders' value distributions are permitted to be correlated. With independent distributions, however, the worst-known… Expand
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