Corpus ID: 1046606

An improved search technique for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions

@article{Sandholm2004AnIS,
  title={An improved search technique for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions},
  author={T. Sandholm},
  journal={37th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2004. Proceedings of the},
  year={2004},
  pages={10 pp.-}
}
  • T. Sandholm
  • Published 2004
  • Computer Science
  • 37th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2004. Proceedings of the
  • Combinatorial auctions allow bidders to bid their synergistic values. Because of complementarities between different assets, bidders give their preferences not just for particular items but also for sets or bundles of items. This form of auction shows great potential under some given circumstances but is still in its infancy. The difficulty lies in finding the optimal price that is the price of a revenue maximizing set of winning bids. Determining the revenue maximizing set of winning bids is… CONTINUE READING
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