An honest look at hybrid theories of pleasure

@article{Pallies2020AnHL,
  title={An honest look at hybrid theories of pleasure},
  author={Daniel Pallies},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
  year={2020}
}
Normative explanation unchained
TLDR
It is argued that one important kind of normative explanations which first-order normative theories aim to formulate and defend can fail to transmit downward along chains of metaphysical determination of normative facts by non-normative facts.

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