An experimental examination of the volunteer's dilemma

@article{Goeree2017AnEE,
  title={An experimental examination of the volunteer's dilemma},
  author={Jacob K. Goeree and Charles A. Holt and Angela M. Smith},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  year={2017},
  volume={102},
  pages={303-315}
}
In a volunteer's dilemma, only one “volunteer” is needed to obtain a benefit for all. Volunteering is costly, and the symmetric Nash equilibrium involves randomization. These predictions have the intuitive property that volunteer rates decline with larger groups, but surprisingly, the probability of obtaining no volunteers is increasing with group size, even as the number of players goes to infinity. These predictions are evaluated in a laboratory experiment with a range of group sizes… CONTINUE READING
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