An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining

  title={An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining},
  author={Werner G{\"u}th and R. Wayne Schmittberger and Bernd Schwarze},
  journal={Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},

Ultimatum Bargaining for a Shrinking Cake — An Experimental Analysis —

In an ultimatum bargaining game two players have to divide a given positive amount c of money. First player 1 demands how much of the ‘cake’ c he desires for himself. Then player 2 can either accept

Lies, Probabilities, and Threats in Ultimatum Games

Many papers have used the ultimatum game as a means to test bargaining behavior. A subset of experiments has examined the use of cheap talk and asymmetric in bargaining scenarios. Yet, this earlier

Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: The State of the Art

In the basic ultimatum bargaining game two players, P1 and P2, must divide a pie ( ). P1 proposes a division in which he gets x and P2 gets x. P2 can then accept the division, in which the is split


Empirical research has discovered that experimental subjects in ultimatum bargaining situations generally fail to play the decision-theoretic optimum strategy, and instead play something between that

Reputations and Fairness in Bargaining - Experimental Evidence from a Repeated Ultimatum Game With Fixed Opponents

The results of Ultimatum Game experiments are often quoted as evidence for the role of fairness in bargaining or in economic behaviour more generally. This paper argues that the observed fairness

Efficiency by trust in fairness? multiperiod ultimatum bargaining experiments with an increasing cake

Previous ultimatum bargaining experiments have shown that bargainers face the conflict whether to exploit bargaining power or to comply with basic norms of distributive justice. In multiperiod

Ultimatum Game Bargaining in a Partially Directed Search Market

Abstract We investigate a partially directed search and bargaining market with a laboratory experiment. First, sellers post intervals of possible surplus splits (i.e. the payoffs that would result

Examining the impact of relative standing using an ultimatum bargaining game experiment

This paper presents the results of an experiment designed to examine the extent to which a decision-maker's relative standing affects bargaining behaviour. In each session, 14 participants played a



Noncooperative Bargaining Models

Classical game theory makes a fundamental distinction between cooperative and non-cooperative games, which later writers have found unsatisfactory because any two-way classification based on two different criteria at the same time is always logically problematic.

The chain store paradox

The chain store game is a simple game in extensive form which produces an inconsistency between game theoretical reasoning and plausible human behavior. Well-informed players must be expected to

A Difficulty in the Concept of Fairness

This note raises a new difficulty concerning the possibility of satisfying equity and Pareto efficiency objectives simultaneously. When interpersonal comparisons of utility are ruled out, which is

Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game

Parts I and II of this paper have described a new theory for the analysis of games with incomplete information. Two cases have been distinguished: consistent games in which there exists some basic

Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points

Part I of this paper has described a new theory for the analysis of games with incomplete information. It has been shown that, if the various players' subjective probability distributions satisfy a

Essays in Mathematical Economics, in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern

  • 1967