An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution

@inproceedings{Trockel2011AnEN,
  title={An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution},
  author={Walter Trockel},
  year={2011}
}
This article provides an exact non-cooperative foundation of the sequential Raiffa solution for two-person bargaining games. Based on an approximate foundation due to Myerson (1991) for any two-person bargaining game (S, d) an extensive form game GS,d is defined that has an infinity of weakly subgame perfect equilibria whose payoff vectors coincide with that of the sequential Raiffa solution of (S, d). Moreover all those equilibria share the same equilibrium path consisting of proposing the… CONTINUE READING

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